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Accountants' Liability For Unaudited
Historical And Prospective Financial
Statements
The dramatic increase in the use of non-audit services is posing an
increased litigation burden on the accountant. In negligence ac-
tions concerning non-audit services, courts have been reluctant to
fully accept the profession's internal guidelines as recognized stan-
dards of care. Certain courts have also taken an expansive view,
holding accountants liable to virtually all third parties. This Com-
ment advocates that the courts fully adopt the standards of care
outlined by pertinent AICPA pronouncements. Courts should also
restrict accountants' liability for non-audit services to third par-
ties who are in privity with the accountant.
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the traditional function of the accountant was to
perform an examination of financial statements' to enable the ac-
countant 2 to issue a report expressing an opinion that the financial
statements were fairly presented.3 As the highest level of service that
1. A 1972 survey of the eight largest accounting firms shows that revenue from
examinations of financial statements comprises from 58 % to 78 % of the estimated net
billings. Note, Accountants Liability for Compilation and Review Engagements, 60 TEx.
L. REV. 759, 761, n.4 (1982).
2. The term "accountant" in the context of this Comment refers to a certified
public accountant (CPA). A CPA must be licensed by the state in which he or she
wishes to practice. CPA licenses are only issued to candidates who have passed the na-
tionally uniform comprehensive exam and fulfilled certain education and experience re-
quirements. See R. BERGER, JR., PRACTICAL ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 6 (1981).
3. The basic form of a standard accountant's audit report is as follows:
We have examined the balance sheet of X Company as of December 31,
19XX, and the related statements of income and retained earnings and changes
in financial position for the year then ended. Our examination was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, in-
cluded such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures
as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly the
financial position of X Company at December 31, 19XX, and the results of its
can be provided by the accountant, the examination" requires the
accountant to perform extensive auditing procedures 5 translating
into higher fees.
During the past thirty years, increased competition and an infla-
tionary economy resulted in small businesses becoming more depen-
dent on financing from creditors and third party investors. 6 These
investors and creditors required some form of assurance from an in-
dependent party that the company's financial statements were fairly
presented. However, small companies were typically unable to afford
the fees for a complete financial statement examination. As a result,
many third party investors and creditors began accepting a new form
of limited assurance from accountants which was below the assur-
ance given in an audit performed in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards (GAAS).
Many accountants responded to the needs of small businesses by
performing various non-audit procedures on financial statements.8
Accountants began to issue reports to creditors and investors indicat-
ing some level of assurance, even though the financial statements
were not audited. During this time, the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants (AICPA)9 issued standards for examina-
tions of financial statements of large companies; however, these stan-
dards did not address the performance of non-audit services. 10 At the
same time, the public's perception of the unaudited report was that
the accountant's level of inquiry was higher than that specified in the
report. Hence, the profession, the public, and the courts became con-
fused as to the standard of care required by an accountant in a non-
audit situation.
Consequently, the AICPA promulgated Statement on Standards
for Accounting and Review Services No. 1 (SSARS No. 1) which set
forth two levels of services to be performed by accountants with re-
operations and the changes in its financial position for the year then ended, in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis
consistent with that of the preceding year.
J. SULLIVAN, R. GNOSPELIUS, P. DEFLIESE, & H. JAENICKE, MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING
883 (1985) [hereinafter J.' SULLIVAN].
4. The terms "examination" and "audit" of financial statements are used
interchangeably.
5. In order for an accountant to issue an audit report, he must perform the pro-
cedures in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. J. SULLIVAN, supra
note 3, at 30.
6. Note, supra note 1, at 761.
7. D. CARMICHAEL & J. WILLINGHAM, PERSPECTIVES IN AUDITING 422 (1985)
[hereinafter D. CARMICHAEL].
8. Id. at 423.
9. One of the functions of the AICPA is to promulgate standards for the profes-
sion. See generally D. CARMICHAEL, supra note 7, at 69-74.
10. Id. at 422.
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spect to unaudited historical financial statements.' The first service
is a review of financial statements in which the accountant performs
certain procedures to achieve a level of assurance that the financial
statements are fairly presented.' 2 The second is a compilation of fi-
nancial statements in which the accountant does not perform any
procedures unless information provided to him for the purpose of the
compilation is unsatisfactory or the financial statements are obvi-
ously not in conformity with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (GAAP).'3
Over the past decade, there has been increasing interest in pro-
spective financial statements.14 Potentially, investors and creditors
will focus more on prospective, rather than historical information be-
cause the future will have a greater bearing on their decisions. This
heightened reliance increases the likelihood of legal action against
the accountant should the financial statement user experience losses
as a result of the examined company's business failure.
Until recently, the professional pronouncements created some con-
fusion as to the standard of care required of accountants in perform-
ing services on prospective financial information.' In 1985 the
AICPA responded by issuing Statement on Standards for Account-
ants' Services on Prospective Financial Information (SSASPF1).'6
Under the new standards, an accountant can provide only three
types of service for a financial forecast or projection:' 7 (1) examina-
11. Statements on Standards for Accounting and Review Services No. 1 § 1
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1979) [hereinafter SSARS No. 1].
12. Id. at 3. See infra text accompanying note 38.
13. SSARS No. 1, supra note 11, at 3.




17. SSASPFI distinguishes a financial forecast from a projection and defines
them as follows:
Financial forecast. Prospective financial statements that present, to the best of
the [company's] knowledge and belief, an entity's expected financial position,
results of operations, and changes in financial position. A financial forecast is
based on the [company's] assumptions reflecting conditions it expects to exist
and the course of action it expects to take. A financial forecast may be ex-
pressed in specific monetary amounts as a single point estimate of forecasted
results or as a range, where the [company] selects key assumptions to form a
range within which it reasonably expects, to the best of its knowledge and be-
lief, the item or items subject to the assumptions to actually fall. When a fore-
cast contains a range, the range is not selected in a biased or misleading man-
ner, for example, a range in which one end is significantly less expected than
the other.
Financial projection. Prospective financial statements that present, to the best
tion, 18 (2) compilation, or (3) application of agreed-upon procedures.
The levels of responsibility assumed by the accountant in perform-
ing non-audit work on historical versus prospective financial state-
ments are very similar. Therefore, the same legal arguments used for
limiting the accountant's liability as to historical financial statements
can be applied to prospective financial statements.
The accountant's liability in the non-audit situation, depends upon
the level of care required of the accountant and whether the finan-
cial statement user has a cause of action for the accountant's
negligence.
This Comment will address two main legal issues related to ac-
countants' liability for negligently performed non-audit procedures
on historical and prospective financial statements. The first issue is
whether the AICPA pronouncements related to non-audit services
are sufficiently defined to enable courts to use them as a standard of
reasonable care.
Recent decisions indicate judicial reluctance to accept the new
AICPA pronouncements as a sufficient determination of the stan-
dard of care required of the accountant in a non-audit engagement. 19
This Comment argues that the courts should accept the AICPA pro-
nouncements, with minor modifications, as the required standard of
care to be followed by accountants. Acceptance of these standards
would likely decrease the courts' reliance on extrinsic sources in de-
termining the standard of care required.
The second is whether accountants' liability for non-audit services
should extend to third parties not in privity. This Comment argues
that policy reasons dictate that a lack of privity should bar third
party actions seeking to impose liability for accountants' negligence
in all non-audit engagements.
Finally, this Comment urges the state legislatures to statutorily
establish clear negligence criteria based on the type of services to be
performed, specifically, audit versus non-audit criteria. At the same
of the [company's] knowledge and belief, given one or more hypothetical as-
sumptions, an entity's expected financial position, results of operations, and
changes in financial position. A financial projection is sometimes prepared to
present one or more hypothetical courses of action for evaluation as in response
to a question such as "What would happen if... ?" A financial projection is
based on the [company's] assumptions reflecting conditions it expects would
exist and the course of action it expects would be taken, given one or more
hypothetical assumptions. A projection, like a forecast, may contain a range.
Statement on Standards for Accountants' Services on Prospective Financial Information
§ 6 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1985) (hereinafter SSASPFI).
18. The discussion of examinations of prospective financial statements is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
19. See generally Robert Wooler Co. v. Fidelity Bank, 330 Pa. Super. 523, 479
A.2d 1027 (1984); Margolies v. Landy & Rothbaum, 136 II, App. 3d 635, 483 N.E.2d
626 (1985).
[VOL. 25: 757, 1988] Accountants' Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
time, accountants must specifically indicate to users of non-audit re-
ports the level of reliance that should not be placed on these financial
statements. This will better educate the business community and the
public as to the limitations of non-audit services.
In addressing the above issues, this Comment will trace the histor-
ical response of the courts to accountants' liability for non-audit ser-
vices. Further, the Comment will discuss the courts' apparent unwill-
ingness to accept the current AICPA pronouncements as a basis of
the standard of professional care. Next, the Comment will explain
the split in authority regarding accountants' liability for non-audit
services to third parties. Finally, the Comment will discuss the policy
arguments for and against extending accountants' liability to third
parties and will conclude that such liability should be limited only to
parties who are in or approach privity with the accountant.
II. ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY FOR NON-AUDITED SERVICES: THE
COURTS' HISTORICAL RESPONSE
A. Case History
During the past twenty years, courts have generally refused to
shield accountants from liability on grounds that the accountant
specified that the financial statements were unaudited.20 The reason
was partly due to an "expectation gap" between the perceived and
actual responsibilities assumed by an accountant in performing non-
audit work.2 1 Financial statement users, as well as courts, believed
that accountants were required to perform certain audit type proce-
dures even though the parties contracted for a non-audit
compilation.
The major early case, holding accountants liable for damages in a
non-audit engagement, was 1136 Tenants Corp. v. Max Rothenberg
& Co.22 The Rothenberg court held that an accountant was liable to
his client for the failure to discover a $237,279 embezzlement during
a compilation engagement costing $600.23 The accounting profession
was disturbed by the Rothenberg decision because the court seem-
ingly required the performance of onerous procedures for the com-
20. See generally 1136 Tenants Corp. v. Max Rothenberg & Co., 36 A.D.2d 804,
319 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1971); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
21. D. CARMICHAEL, supra note 7, at 430.
22. 36 A.D.2d 804, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007.
23. Id. at 805, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
pletion of a straightforward compilation. 24 The dissenting judge ar-
gued that to require an accountant engaged in a simple compilation
to investigate and inform the client of all potentially suspicious activ-
ities "would expand the obligation from bookkeeping to criminal de-
tection. ''25 Moreover, the Rothenberg court specified the level of ser-
vice to be performed by the accountant where the nature of the
engagement had not been specifically clarified by the parties.26
The Iowa Supreme Court in Ryan v. Kanne27 extended account-
ants' liability for non-audit services to third parties not in privity. In
Ryan, a company in need of financing sought the assistance of an
accountant to qualify for a loan.28 The purpose of the engagement
was to determine the correct amount of accounts payable.2 9 The fi-
nancial statements prepared by the accountant were clearly marked
unaudited and included a description of the actual procedures em-
ployed. 30 The accountant, however, failed to secure an engagement
letter which enumerated the specific services to be performed by the
accountant.31 The court refused to accept the profession's distinction
between audited and unaudited statements and the corresponding
different levels of responsibility assumed by the accountant.3 2 In-
stead, the court held that "[accountants'] ...liability must be de-
pendent upon their undertaking, not their rejection of
dependability. '33
In 1972, the federal district court in Blakely v. Lisac34 also im-
posed additional audit type procedures on the accountant performing
non-audit work. The court held that "[e]ven when performing an
unaudited write-up, an accountant is under a duty to undertake at
least a minimal investigation into the figures supplied to him."30
B. SSARS No. I
As a result of the above cases, the accounting profession became
painfully aware that the existing professional standards were obso-
lete.36 In 1979, the AICPA responded by issuing SSARS No. 1,
24. Id.
25. Id. at 806, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 1009 (Stever, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 805, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
27. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
28. Id. at 397.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 398.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 404.
33. Id.
34. 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Or. 1972).
35. Id. at 266.
36. The only promulgated standard was Statement of Auditing Procedure (SAP)
No. 38 (1967) which essentially provided that the accountant had no responsibility to
apply any auditing procedures to unaudited financial statements. See Note, supra note 1,
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which established two distinct standards for the issuance of an ac-
countant's report when the historical financial statements are not au-
dited.37 The first is a compilation, which involves preparation of fi-
nancial statements based on "information that is the representation
of management [owners] without undertaking to express any assur-
ance on the statements." 38 The second is a review which entails
"[p]erforming inquiry and analytical procedures that provide the ac-
countant with a reasonable basis for expressing limited assurance
that there are no material modifications that should be made to the
statements in order for them to be in conformity with GAAP."39
The objectives of both a review and a compilation differ from the
objective of an examination in accordance with GAAS.40 Financial
statements users should be able to readily identify the degree of re-
sponsibility, if any, the accountant is assuming with respect to such
statements."' Therefore, SSARS No. 1 requires the accountant to
issue a report describing the procedures performed and level of as-
surance given by the accountant.42
at 787.
37. SSARS No. 1, supra note 11, § 1.
38. Id. § 4.
39. Id.
40. SSARS No. I distinguishes the objective of an audit and review as follows:
The objective of an audit is to provide a reasonable basis for expressing an
opinion regarding the financial statements taken as a whole. A review does not
provide a basis for the expression of such an opinion because a review does not
contemplate a study and evaluation of internal accounting control, tests of ac-
counting records and of responses to inquiries by obtaining corroborating evi-
dential matter through inspection, observation or confirmation, and certain
other procedures ordinarily performed during an audit. A review may bring to
the accountant's attention significant matters affecting the financial statements,
but it does not provide assurance that the accountant will become aware of all
significant matters that would be disclosed in an audit.
Id.
41. Id.
42. SSARS No. I suggests that the accountant issue the following standard com-
pilation report upon the completion of a compilation engagement:
The accompanying balance sheet of XYZ Company as of December 31,
19XX, and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and changes in
financial position for the year then ended have been compiled by me (us).
A compilation is limited to presenting, in the form of financial statements,
information that is the representation of management (owners). I (we) have
not audited or reviewed the accompanying financial statements and, accord-
ingly, do not express an opinion or any other form of assurance on them.
Id. § 17.
SSARS No. I suggests the following standard form report for a review engagement:
I (we) have reviewed the accompanying balance sheet of XYZ Company as
of December 31, 19XX, and the related statements of income, retained earn-
ings, and changes in financial position for the year then ended, in accordance
C. SSASPFI
The growing involvement of accountants with their clients' pro-
spective financial statements has also sparked the need for detailed
standards of performance. In prior years, there was no significant
litigation arising out of the accountant's association with prospective
financial statements. However, recent judicial willingness to hold ac-
countants liable for a variety of non-audit services has increased the
potential of future litigation in this area. In response to the profes-
sion's needs, the AICPA issued SSASPFI.43 Pursuant to this stan-
dard the accountant is able to provide two non-audit type services; a
compilation and an application of agreed upon procedures to the fi-
nancial statements. 4
In a compilation of prospective financial statements, the account-
ant is required to determine whether the prospective financial state-
ments are in conformity with AICPA presentation guidelines and
whether the underlying assumptions are obviously inappropriate. 45
Further, the accountant must issue a report which expresses no con-
clusion and provides no assurance on the compiled prospective finan-
cial statements or on the assumptions underlying such statements.46
In an engagement which requires an accountant to apply agreed-
upon procedures to prospective financial statements, the procedures
with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants. All information included in these financial statements is the repre-
sentation of the management (owners) of XYZ Company.
A review consists principally of inquiries of company personnel and analyti-
cal procedures applied to financial data. It is substantially less in scope than an
examination in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, the ob-
jective of which is the expression of an opinion regarding the financial state-
ments taken as a whole. Accordingly, I (we) do not express such an opinion.
Based on my (our) review, I am (we are) not aware of any material modifi-
cations that should be made to the accompanying financial statements for them
to be in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
Id. § 35.
43. SSASPFI, supra note 17, § 1.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 10.
46. SSASPFI requires the accountant's standard report on a compilation of pro-
spective financial statements to include the following:
a. An identification of the prospective financial statements presented by the
responsible party.
b. A statement that the accountant has compiled the prospective financial
statements in accordance with standards established by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants.
c. A statement that a compilation is limited in scope and does not enable the
accountant to express an opinion or any other form of assurance on the pro-
spective financial statements or the assumptions.
d. A caveat that the prospective results may not be achieved.
e. A statement that the accountant assumes no responsibility to update the
report for events and circumstances occurring after the date of the report.
Id. § 4.
764.
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applied may be limited or extensive, according to the specified user's
desire."' The accountant is required to issue a report which enumer-
ates the procedures performed, states the accountant's findings and
restricts distribution of the report to the specified parties.48
III. CURRENT AICPA PRONOUNCEMENTS AS A STANDARD OF
PROFESSIONAL CARE
A. Unaudited Historical Financial Statements
Recent court decisions have essentially been silent as to the courts'
acceptance of SSARS No. 1 as a standard of professional care.4 9 In
Robert Wooler Co. v. Fidelity Bank,50 liability was extended to ac-
countants performing an unaudited review for failing to inform com-
pany management of weaknesses in internal control which led an
employee to defraud the company.51 The accountants had not repre-
sented to management that a review of the company's internal con-
trol would be performed. Moreover, the review report was silent as
to the internal control matters.52
In setting forth standards for accountants, SSARS No. 1 specifi-
47. "However, mere reading of prospective financial statements does not consti-
tute a procedure sufficient to permit an accountant to report on the results of applying
agreed upon procedures to such statements." Id. § 51.
48. SSASPFI requires the accountant's standard report on the results of applying
agreed upon procedures to include the following:
a. Indicate the prospective financial statements covered by the accountant's
report.
b. Indicate that the report is limited in use, intended solely for the specified
users, and should not be used by others.
c. Enumerate the procedures performed and refer to conformity with the
arrangements made with the specified users.
d. If the agreed upon procedures are less than those performed in an exami-
nation, state that the work performed was less in scope than an examination of
prospective financial statements in accordance with AICPA standards and dis-
claim an opinion on whether the presentation of the prospective financial state-
ments is in conformity with AICPA presentation guidelines and on whether the
underlying assumptions provide a reasonable basis for the forecast, or a reason-
able basis for the projection given the hypothetical assumptions.
e. State the accountant's findings.
f. Include a caveat that the prospective results may not be achieved.
g. State that the accountant assumes no responsibility to update the report
for events and circumstances occurring after the date of the report.
Id. § 4.
49. See generally Robert Wooler Co. v. Fidelity Bank, 330 Pa. Super. 523, 479
A.2d 1027 (1984); Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979).
50. 330 Pa. Super. 523, 479 A.2d 1027 (1984).
51. Id. at 528, 479 A.2d at 1029.
52. Id. at 531, 479 A.2d at 1031.
cally states that "[a] review does not contemplate a study and evalu-
ation of internal accounting control."53 In contrast, an accountant
performing an audit is required by GAAS to review and evaluate the
company's internal control environment.54 The standard review re-
port clearly indicates that a review "is substantially less in scope
than an examination in accordance with GAAS. ' '5
In Robert Wooler Co., the court refused to shield the accountant
from liability, even though the review report specifically included
similar unambiguous statements as to the scope of the accountant's
work.56 The court held that an accountant, by simply agreeing to
perform non-audited services, undertook to exercise that degree of
accounting skill possessed by other accountants in the community.57
Hence, the standard of care is based heavily on the subjective opin-
ions of expert witnesses rather than a clear professional standard as
set forth by the AICPA.5a Inconsistencies will result as the judgment
of reasonable accountants may differ, "especially when one of these
accountants is a plaintiff's expert offering his opinion with the bene-
fit of hindsight. 59
The essence of the Robert Wooler Co. decision requires the ac-
countant to do more than he or she has contractually agreed to do. It
requires the accountant to perform procedures not normally em-
ployed in an unaudited review. This situation will inevitably lead ac-
countants to incur more billable hours. The result will ultimately de-
feat the key purpose for a review-lower fees to companies unable to
bear the burden of a costly audit.
The courts' continued insistence on holding accountants liable for
negligence resulting from non-audit work is not limited to the Robert
Wooler Co. decision. In Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 0
an accountant was engaged to prepare unaudited financial state-
ments based on information provided by the client. The plaintiff, a
third party, alleged that the accountant's negligent preparation of
financial statements caused him to rely on the statements to his det-
53. SSARS No. 1, supra note 11, § 29.
54. See generally J. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 241-342.
55. SSARS No. 1, supra note 11, § 35.
56. Robert Wooler Co., 330 Pa. Super. at 533, 479 A.2d at 1032.
57. The court relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 299A holding:
"Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes
to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill
and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good stand-
ing in similar communities." Id. at 1031 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
299A (1982)).
58. The court relied on an expert witness opinion that an accountant possessing
reasonable accounting skill would have been aware of the potential for theft inherent in
plaintiff's internal control. Id. at 1033.
59. D. CARMICHAEL, supra note 7, at 433-34.
60. 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982).
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riment.61 The court held the accountant liable even though the finan-
cial statements specifically stated they were unaudited.6 2 Further, it
was not unreasonable for a third party "to rely upon an accountant
to verify the substantive accuracy of the information presented in an
unaudited financial statement." 63 A statement that the financial
statements were unaudited was insufficient for the accountant to es-
cape a duty of reasonable care. Instead, the duty of care to be exer-
cised was to be determined by the specific understanding between
the parties as to the scope of the work. 4
A recent decision of the New York Supreme Court Appellate Di-
vision might signal a break in the courts' silence with respect to
SSARS No. I and the corresponding refusal to accept the audit/
review distinction. In William Iselin & Co., Inc. v. Landau,65 the
court refused to hold the accountant liable for negligence in an non-
audit engagement. 6 In Landau, the plaintiff was in the business of
factoring receivables from various companies. The plaintiff sustained
losses when a company, whose financial statements were reviewed by
the defendant accountant, filed for bankruptcy. 7 The accountant's
review report specifically indicated that the financial statements were
unaudited and that no opinion was expressed by him as to their fair-
ness. 8 Moreover, the plaintiff performed his own independent analy-
sis of the company's financial condition. 9
The court held that no negligence cause of action existed, basing
its decision on three factors. First, the plaintiff was not entitled to
place reliance on the financial statements as they were only reviewed
and not audited by the accountant. Second, the plaintiff did not rely
on the statements as he conducted an independent analysis of the
company's financial statements. Third, the plaintiff was not in privity
with the accountant because his relationship to the accountant was
insubstantial.70 The Landau court seemingly accepted the audit/re-
61. Id. at 900, 451 A.2d at 1309.
62. Id. at 906, 451 A.2d at 1313.
63. Id. at 905, 451 A.2d at 1313.
64. The accountant prior to commencing work typically issues a letter to the cli-
ent setting forth the specific understanding as to the scope of non-audit work to be per-
formed. This letter describes the nature of service (compilation or review) and generally
enumerates the procedures to be performed.
65. William Iselin & Co., Inc. v. Landau, 128 A.D.2d 453, 513 N.Y.S.2d 3(1987).





view distinction along with its differing duties of care. This could
imply the court's acceptance of SSARS No. I as a guideline for de-
termining the standard of care.
Nevertheless, the Landau decision leaves certain questions unan-
swered. Narrowly construed, Landau might apply only where the
plaintiff has also performed an independent analysis of a company,
thereby diminishing the reliance on the accountant's report. Further,
the standard of due care remains undefined since the court did not
expressly discuss SSARS No. 1. Lastly, because lack of privity is a
total bar to extending accountants' liability to third parties in New
York, it could be argued that the court's discussion of the audit/
review distinction is dictum and not binding precedent on future
New York cases.7 1 In Landau, even if the accountant was negligent,
he would not be liable to the plaintiff because lack of privity would
bar recovery.
After Landau, the standard of due care to be applied remains un-
clear.72 The courts have generally remained unwilling to move away
from the traditional "expert accountant witness" approach.7 3 Contin-
ued judicial reliance on the traditional approach has led to a general
uncertainty as to the level of effort required by the accountant in
order to avoid liability. Faced with uncertainty, accountants will
tend to expand their procedures in performing reviews and compila-
tions, passing on the additional cost to their client companies. Conse-
quently, many companies, unable to afford higher accountants' fees,
will be forced to eliminate the valuable service of having independent
accountants perform unaudited reviews of their financial statements.
This will have a chilling effect on the financing and expansion of
small businesses. 4 Therefore, courts should adopt the standards set
forth in SSARS No. I to provide the accounting profession with an
objective criteria for determining the minimum procedures necessary
to avoid malpractice liability.
B. Unaudited Prospective Financial Statements
In contrast with historical financial statements, the accountants'
only recent involvement with prospective financial statements has led
to minimal judicial interpretation regarding the standards of due
care to be followed by accountants in performing non-audit work on
financial forecasts and projections. In light of the certain similarities
between historical financial statements and prospective financial
statements, courts may draw on the more established legal doctrines
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
74. Note, supra note 1, at 761.
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developed with respect to the accountant's level of care required in
preparing unaudited historical financial statements.
In Margolies v. Landy & Rothbaum, 5 the defendant accountant
prepared, without an audit, a net earnings projection upon which the
sale price for plaintiff's business was based. After the plaintiff sold
the business, the actual earnings materially exceeded the projected
amount.7 6 The plaintiff claimed that the negligent preparation of the
projection caused him to receive less than he was entitled from the
sale of the business.77 On appeal, the court held that the accountant
satisfied a level of care that "is a very high level of professional re-
sponsibility similar to any other profession; legal [or] medical. 7 8
Further, the level of responsibility assumed by the accountant was
reduced because the accountant's report indicated that the projection
was unaudited.79 "[T]he nature of the obligation undertaken by the
accountant is a factor in every malpractice case."80 Both sides em-
ployed expert witnesses to enable the fact finder to determine
whether the accountant was negligent. 81
In Margolies, the court adhered to the traditional and subjective
approach of using other accountants as expert witnesses in determin-
ing whether the standard of care was breached. 82 But the court also
acknowledged that the accountant's labeling of a report as unaudited
is at least a partial shield against malpractice liability.83 Hence, the
court's willingness to draw the audit/non-audit distinction could be
an indication of at least partial acceptance of the standards set forth
by the AICPA in SSASPFI as a minimum standard of due care.""
IV. ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY FOR NON-AUDIT SERVICES TO
THIRD PARTIES
The landmark decision regarding accountants' general liability to
third parties is Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.85 In Ultramares, Justice
Cardozo introduced the privity doctrine which shields accountants
75. 136 Ill. App. 3d 635, 636, 483 N.E.2d 626, 628 (1985).
76. Id. at 636-7, 483 N.E.2d at 628.
77. Id. at 636, 483 N.E.2d at 628.
78. Id. at 638, 483 N.E.2d at 629 (quoting the trial court).




8,3. Id. at 639, 483 N.E.2d at 630.
84. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
85. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
from liability to third parties who are only incidental beneficiaries to
a contract. 86 Cardozo reasoned that if liability for negligence to third
parties were imposed, "the failure to detect theft or forgery beneath
the cover of deceptive entries may expose accountants to a liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeter-
minate class."87 Although Ultramares involved a negligently per-
formed audit, the court's policy arguments similarly apply to ac-
countants' involvement with unaudited financial statements.
Cardozo distinguished the Ultramares facts from cases involving
third party recovery for physical injuries resulting from the negligent
manufacture of a product.88 Although the same court which decided
Ultramares had eliminated the privity rule in physical injury cases,89
the court stated that a similar limitation of the privity rule was not
warranted as to non-physical (economic) injuries.90
In an effort to provide third parties with a remedy against negli-
gent accountants, other jurisdictions have continually assaulted the
citadel of privity thereby eroding the effects of Ultramares.91 Courts
have fashioned four alternatives to the Ultramares approach which
have led to a split in authority among the various jurisdictions. This
section discusses the four approaches and how they apply to account-
ants' liability to third parties in a non-audit environment.
A. Modified Privity Approach
As discussed earlier, Landau did not extend accountants' liability
to third parties for an unaudited review.92 The court relied on Credit
Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co.93 which follows the privity doc-
trine set forth in Ultramares with certain modifications.
The Credit Alliance court set forth three criteria which must be
met before accountants' liability extends to third parties. They are as
follows:
(1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial reports were to
86. Id. at 174, 174 N.E. at 445-48.
87. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 444.
88. Id. at 174, 174 N.E. at 445.
89. See generally MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916).
90. In creating the distinction between physical and economic injuries, the Ul-
tramares court appeared to have placed a premium on injuries which caused bodily
harm. The court justified the lower premium placed on economic injuries from a policy
standpoint which favors limitation of liability for injuries to property. Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche, 255 N.Y. at 174, 174 N.E. at 445.
91. See generally Robert Wooler Co., 330 Pa. Super. 523, 479 A.2d 1027; Inter-
national Mortg. v. John P. Butler Accountancy, 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr.
218 (1986).
92. Landau, 128 A.D.2d 453, 513 N.Y.S.2d 3. See supra note 65 and accompa-
nying text.
93. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985).
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be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of
which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3) there must
have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that
party or parties, which evinces the accountants' understanding of that party
or parties' reliance.
94
The court's approach was not intended as a significant departure
from Ultramares. Instead, it was designed to "preserve the wisdom
and policy" set forth by Justice Cardozo.95 The Credit Alliance deci-
sion echoes the Ultramares doctrine that accountants' liability
should extend to third parties only when the relationship between the
accountant and the third party is clearly one approaching "that of
privity, if not completely one with it."96
In Toro Company v. Krouse, Kern & Company, Inc.,97 the Sev-
enth Circuit adopted the modified privity approach of Credit Alli-
ance. The court reiterated the policy reasons for distinguishing be-
tween economic and physical injuries.9" The court stressed that lack
of privity should be a shield to protect accountants from liability for
economic but not for physical injuries.99
Therefore, it appears certain courts have adopted the modified
privity approach as a way to limit accountant's liability to third
parties.
B. Restatement Approach
Another approach taken by the courts with respect to accountants'
liability to third parties is known as the restatement approach. The
Second Restatement of Torts rejects the privity doctrine and favors
extending liability to third parties specifically foreseen by the ac-
countant. 100 This approach allows recovery to parties whom the ac-
94. Id. at 544, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 545, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444 (quoting Coleco Indus.,
Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275, 309 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
97. 827 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987).
98. Id. at 160.
99. Id. (citing Citizens Gas & Coke Util. v. American Economy Ins. Co., 486
N.E.2d 998 (Ind. 1985)).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). This section provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others
(I) One who, in the course of his ... profession ... supplies false informa-
tion for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liabil-
ity for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the in-
formation, if he fails to exercise reasonable care of competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
(2) [... ] [T]he liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
countant knew his or her clients intended to influence with the finan-
cial statements, as well as those the accountant actually intended to
influence with the financial statements.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Spherex, Inc. v. Alexan-
der Grant & Co.101 adopted the Restatement approach and held ac-
countants liable to third parties for inaccurately prepared unaudited
financial statements. The court elected not to follow the privity doc-
trine set forth in Ultramares for two reasons.10 2 First, the court
noted that many judges have not hesitated to permit recovery where
the plaintiff's identity was specifically known to the negligent de-
fendant. 103 Second, the court distinguished Ultramares "as a relic of
a bygone economic era.' 104
Spherex, Inc. drew parallels between accountants' liability for
negligence and the strict product liability doctrine for manufactur-
ers. 105 The court noted that accountants, like manufacturers, are in a
position to regulate the effects of their conduct by controlling the
degree of care exercised. 106 "The accountant, through the fee struc-
ture, can pass along to his clients the cost of insuring against finan-
cial loss sustained by them through reliance upon his negligent mis-
statement of fact. 10 7 The court, however, stressed that section 552
of the Second Restatement of Torts provided the necessary bound-
ary of liability. "[T]he law must not arbitrarily extend that liability
beyond . . .[the accountant's] reasonable expectations as to whom
the information will reach."10 8
In Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek,10 9 an accountant was engaged by a
company to prepare its financial statements without an audit. The
financial statements, prepared by the accountant, identified the
plaintiff-creditor's major relationship to the company.110 From this,
the Federal District Court, applying Nebraska law, implied that the
accountant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's reliance on the
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient in-
tends to supply it ....
101. 122 N.H. 898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982).
102. Id. at 903, 451 A.2d at 1311.
103. Id. This approach is not contrary to the Ultramares social utility rationale of
protecting professionals from the dangers of unlimited liability.
104. Id. The court stated further that "[b]oth the sophistication of modern ac-
counting procedures and the accountant's central role in the financing and investment
industry are a far cry from the fledgling profession in need of judicial protection that
existed at the time of Ultramares." Id. at 903-4, 451 A.2d at 1311.
105. Id. at 904, 451 A.2d at 1312.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 905, 451 A.2d at 1312.
109. 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979).
110. Id. at 343.
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financial statements.*** The plaintiff sued the accountant when it be-
came aware of the financial statements' inaccuracies resulting from
the accountant's negligence. 112 The court, in denying the account-
ant's motion to dismiss the suit, indicated a reluctance to "cling to
the outmoded and restrictive doctrine of privity as a precondition to
a finding of accountant's liability."113 The decision stated that settled
Nebraska law appeared to be favoring the Second Restatement of
Torts approach.114 The court rejected the accountant's argument
that the Restatement approach was only acceptable in negligence ac-
tions involving audited financial statements.115
From the above it is apparent that a few courts have chosen to
follow the restatement approach in determining the extent of ac-
countants' liability to third parties.
C. Balancing Test Approach
Certain courts have accepted a third approach which focuses on
various policy and factual considerations. The balancing test ap-
proach, as it applies to professional malpractice, was first introduced
in Biakanja v. Irving."1 6 The Biakanja court found a notary public
liable to a beneficiary of a will because the notary failed to obtain
proper attestation.11 7
A similar balancing test was applied in Missouri in Aluma Kraft
Manufacturing Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co. 18 In Aluma Kraft, the
court extended liability to accountants where no privity of contract
existed. The court considered and balanced certain factors such as
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plain-
tiff, the foreseeability of harm, the degree of certainty that the plain-
tiff was injured, and the proximity between the defendant's conduct
Ill. id.
112. Id. at 341.
113. Id. at 343.
114. Id. at 344.
115. Id.
116. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
117. Id. The Court in Biakanja held as follows:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held lia-
ble to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balanc-
ing of various factors, among which are extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame at-
tached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
118. 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
and the plaintiff's injury.119
In Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Beckaert & Holland,120 a
company engaged accountants to audit its financial statements. The
company forwarded the financial statements to Dunn and Bradstreet
(D&B) for publication.' 2' The plaintiff, a third party vendor relying
on the D&B report, extended over two million dollars in credit to the
company. 22 Subsequently, the company went bankrupt and it be-
came apparent that the audited financial statements had overstated
the company's net worth by a significant amount.123 The plaintiff
then sued the accountants, inter alia, for negligent misrepresenta-
tion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that privity of con-
tract was implied because the plaintiff was an intended third party
beneficiary of the contract between the accountant and the
company.' 24
Moreover, another vendor, who did not rely on the D&B report,
also sued the accountants, alleging damages incurred as a direct re-
sult of its extension of credit to the company.125 Although the vendor
was not a third party beneficiary, the court found a cause of action
against the accountants for a negligently prepared audit.2 6
In establishing a standard for liability, the court refused to follow
the Restatement approach because it "is similar to the privity rule in
that it draws an arbitrary limit on the class of potential plaintiffs." 27
A "reasonably foreseeable" approach was also rejected because of
the magnitude of losses that could result from widespread circulation
of misfortune.128
Instead, the court balanced the following factors: (1) The extent
to which the transaction in question was intended to affect a third
party, (2) the foreseeability of harm to third party, (3) the degree of
certainty that the third party suffered injury, (4) the proximity be-
tween accountant's conduct and injury suffered, (5) the moral blame
attached to the accountant's conduct, and (6) the policy of prevent-
ing future harm. 29
Although the above cases discuss accountants' liability in an audit
environment, courts may be inclined to follow the balancing test ap-
119. Id. at 383.
120. 79 N.C. App. 81, 339 S.E.2d 62 (1986).
121. Id. at 84, 339 S.E.2d at 65.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 86, 339 S.E.2d at 65-66.
125. Id. at 87, 339 S.E.2d at 65.
126. Id. at 85, 339 S.E.2d at 66.
127. Id. at 87, 339 S.E.2d at 68 (quoting Note, Negligent Misrepresentation and
the Certified Public Accountant: An Overview of Common Law Liability to Third Par-
ties, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 431, 445 (1984)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
[VOL. 25: 757, 1988] Accountants' Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
proach to extend accountants' liability to third parties for the prepa-
ration of unaudited financial statements.
D. Reasonably Foreseeable Approach
In recent years, several courts have allowed a "reasonably foresee-
able" user of financial statements to recover in negligence against an
accountant despite the lack of privity.130
In International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Corp.,1 31 the accountants audited the financial statements of West-
side Mortgage, Inc. (Westside). Westside arranged financing for real
property by originating the loans and subsequently selling them to
mortgage bankers such as the plaintiff.132 The plaintiff, relying on
the audited financial statements, entered into a business arrange-
ment with Westside to buy and sell certain real estate loans. The
audited financial statements were materially misstated since West-
side's major asset was a worthless note. As a result of the misstated
financial statements, Westside was legally unable to perform on the
contract, resulting in over $400,000 in damages to plaintiff.,3 3 Sub-
sequently, the plaintiff sued Westside and the accountants.
The California Court of Appeals held that the independent audi-
tor owed a duty of care to reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs who re-
lied on negligently audited financial statements.3 The court re-
jected the privity doctrine set forth in Ultramares "as no longer
viable, for the role of the accountant in our society has changed.1 3 5
The court stressed that the independent auditor's function is to ana-
lyze the client's financial status and make public the ultimate find-
ings in accordance with recognized accounting principles. Such a re-
sponsibility creates public trust in the accountant, requiring him or
her to realize that the audited financial statements will be relied
upon by creditors, stockholders or anyone else involved in the finan-
cial aspects of the client . 36 The Restatement approach was not ac-
cepted by the court as it failed to meet California's concept of tort
130. See International Mortg. Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal.
App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461
A.2d 138 (1983); Citizens Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d
361 (1983).
131. 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218.
132. Id. at 808, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
133. Id. at 811, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
134. Id. at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
135. Id. at 819-20, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
136. Id. at 817, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
liability for negligence. 3 7
The court set forth the following policy reasons as a further justifi-
cation for the foreseeability approach:
An innocent plaintiff who foreseeably relies on an independent auditor's un-
qualified financial statement should not be made to bear the burden of the
professional's malpractice. The risk of such loss is more appropriately
placed on the accounting profession which is better able to pass such risk to
its customers and the ultimate consuming public. By doing so, society is
better served; for such a rule provides a financial disincentive for negligent
conduct and will heighten the profession's cautionary techniques."3 8
Courts have yet to address the question of whether the reasonably
foreseeable approach applies to accountants' non-audited services.
The previously mentioned policy arguments' 3" could be made for al-
lowing such an extension of liability to third parties. However, courts
must recognize that they are treading on dangerously thin ice when
they excessively expand accountants' liability in the non-audit area.
The following section will discuss the numerous policy arguments for
and against expanding accountants' liability in the non-audit area.
V. GENERAL EXTENSION OF ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY FOR NON-
AUDIT SERVICES - POLICY CONCERNS
Proponents of expanding accountants' liability to non-audit work
traditionally have set forth four basic arguments. First, it is unfair
for the public to bear the risk of misstated financial statements. 40
Second, imposition of negligence liability encourages more diligent
performance by the accountant.' 4' Third, the accountant is in a bet-
ter position to spread the losses through insurance.142 Fourth, in-
creased assumption of responsibility by the accountant can be justi-
fied by the public perception that the accountant owes some special
duty of care as a financial "policeman." The United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 43 stated a similar
argument as follows:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's fi-
nancial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility tran-
scending any employment relationship with the client. The independent
public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance
to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing
public.' 4 ' (Emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
138. Id.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
140. See Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. at 904, 451 A.2d at
1312.
141. Id. at 905, 451 A.2d at 1312.
142. Id. at 904, 451 A.2d at 1312.
143. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
144. Id. at 817-18.
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This notion of public responsibility has motivated courts to erode the
accountants' privity defense in negligence actions by third parties for
audit as well as non-audit services.145
Several policy arguments support the limitation of accountants' li-
ability with respect to non-audit work. First, the fundamental dis-
tinction between an audit and an unaudited review or compilation of
financial statements justifies different levels of accountants' liability.
In an audit, the accountant is properly held liable if the financial
statements are misstated since the accountants' report expresses an
opinion as to their fairness. In this situation, the risk of misstated
financial statements is properly shifted to the accountant. But in is-
suing a non-audit report, the accountant specifically disclaims an
opinion as to the fairness of the financial statements. This puts the
user on notice that the accountant will not totally assume the risk of
misstated financial statements. By accepting an unaudited report the
investor or creditor in essence must bear some of the risk of financial
misstatements. 46
Second, expanding liability will result in a disincentive for ac-
countants to perform any non-audit work. An accountant will refuse
to perform a financial statement review if held to a standard of an
audit or some other standard which is higher than the one set forth
by the AICPA for unaudited reviews.
Third, increased litigation against accountants may lead to a mal-
practice insurance crisis similar to the one experienced in the medi-
cal and legal professions. 47 Increased insurance costs of accountants
would have to be passed on to the many small companies requiring
unaudited services. Such companies may not be able to afford an
increase in accountants' fees. This could lead such companies to
bankruptcy as their creditors or investors would be unwilling to con-
tinue financing them without financial statements prepared by an in-
dependent third party.
Fourth, the financial "policeman" responsibility is more appropri-
ately a function of the state and federal regulatory agencies rather
145. See generally Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 451
A.2d 1308 (1982); International Mortg. Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177
Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986).
146. Note that the total risk is not shifted to the user of the financial statements as
he or she has a cause of action if the financial statement misstatement results from an
accountant's non-audit work falling below the standards set forth by the AICPA in
SSARS No.] or SSASPFI. Also, assumption of risk by investors and creditors is not new
as it is the key to any investment decision.
147. See generally Note, The Price of Health Care Availability: The Economics
of Medical Malpractice, 11 Sw. U.L. REV. 1371 (1979).
than of the accountant. Charging the accountant with such a broad
public responsibility will inappropriately heighten the public's mis-
conception that the accountant should assume total responsibility for
any problem concerning a company's finances.
Last, the traditional arguments'48 fashioned by courts for ex-
panding liability to accountants are misplaced. These arguments
were derived from the strict products liability doctrines developed in
Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. of Fresno.4 9 The courts' application of these arguments to a
negligence action involving economic injuries is inappropriate. Jus-
tice Traynor's arguments in Escola were directed towards the evolu-
tion of the strict products liability doctrine in the context of physical
injuries and did not advocate an extension of negligence liability in
the context of economic injuries. 50
In light of these policy arguments, the doctrine of modified priv-
ity'15 should be retained to shield the accountant from an expansion
of liability to third parties for non-audit work. Furthermore, the
state legislatures should establish standards, modeled after the
AICPA standards, which set forth the level of care which should be
followed by the accountant in performing the various levels of ser-
vice. Clear guidelines will reduce accountants' necessity to perform
unnecessary procedures which burden companies with greater costs.
Furthermore, the accounting profession should educate the busi-
ness community and the public as to the degree of reliance that
should be placed on the various levels of non-audited services. Non-
audit reports should be expanded to enumerate specifically the areas
for which the accountant is taking no responsibility. The report
should also discuss the limitations to legal recourse available against
the accountant in the event that the financial statements are
misstated.
The AICPA may consider actively participating in drafting litera-
ture designed to educate financial statement users about the limita-
tions of unaudited reviews and compilations. Investors, bankers and
others who rely on such financial statements must understand that
they themselves must assume some portion of the risk resulting from
misstated financial information.
The accountant should be viewed as an unbiased information
source regarding a company's financial condition and operating re-
sults, as opposed to an insurer of the company's financial health. The
business community and public, by obtaining a proper understanding
of the accountant's function in a given situation, will less likely suf-
148. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
149. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
150. Id. at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 92-99.
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fer economic injury because financial decisions will be made more
cautiously, based more on extensive direct investigation and not indi-
rect reliance on accountant prepared financial statements.
VI. CONCLUSION
Court decisions of the past two decades have sent a message to
accountants that a lower standard of care for non-audited services
was unacceptable.'5 2 Part of the problem was that the professional
guidelines which existed prior to 1980 were inadequate to ensure
consistent quality of the unaudited reviews and compilations. 153 The
profession responded by issuing detailed standards in the form of
SSARS No. 1 for historical financial statements and SSASPFI for
prospective financial statements.
However, courts remain reluctant to accept SSARS No. 1 and
SSASPFI as objective standards of professional care to be applied in
determining accountants' liability for performing non-audit services.
Although the standards are well defined, the courts apparently be-
lieve that accountants' work requires significant judgment which the
standards cannot adequately reflect. Therefore, courts have tradi-
tionally relied on experts to draw the line between accountants' neg-
ligent and non-negligent behavior. Over-reliance by the courts on the
subjectivity of these experts may have its price. If the standards of
performance for non-audit work become too subjective and unpre-
dictable, accountants will be forced to provide only expensive audits
to their clients. To ensure the continued availability of unaudited
services by accountants, the state legislatures should develop statu-
tory guidelines of due care modeled after the AICPA standards.
These guidelines will provide accountants with a reliable criteria for
non-negligent conduct.
Courts in various jurisdictions have split over the question of the
extent that third parties may seek recourse against accountants for
negligence. 5 4 Certain jurisdictions favor a more expansive approach,
holding accountants liable to any reasonably foreseeable plaintiff.'5 5
Other jurisdictions favor the more restrictive modified privity ap-
proach which would extend accountants' liability to third parties
only when the relationship between the accountant and the third
152. See supra text accompanying notes 20-35.
153. See supra text accompanying note 36.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 91-138. However, very few courts have
specifically addressed the question in the context of accountants' unaudited services.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 130-38.
party is clearly one approaching that of privity.158
Since the accountant in an unaudited report specifically disclaims
an opinion as to the fairness of the financial statements, the level of
responsibility assumed by the accountant regarding such financial
statements should be reduced. An approach which favors limitation
of accountants' liability is consistent with the policy of shifting back
some of the financial misstatement risk to the financial statement
user. Therefore, courts should utilize the modified privity approach
discussed in Credit Alliance as a shield to protect accountants from
most third party claims for damages arising from non-audit work.
ANDREW L. KoZLOWSKI
156. See supra text accompanying notes 92-99.
